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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the parties to settle their differences by stating to them the
rules of law which govern them.' '
So Montana in adopting the UNIFORm ACT has made pos-
sible the realization of the benefits to be derived from declara-
tory judgments. One might query, however, whether or not it is
being used as extensively by the members of the Montana bar as
it might be used; and it is suggested that a full discussion of the
act by the court in cases where declaratory relief is asked might
promote greater awareness by the bar of the possibilities under
it and fuller realization of the benefits to be derived from it.
Furthermore, careful consideration of the act is necessary if it
is to accomplish its purpose of uniformity in decisions in States
adopting it. And in conclusion, it would be well to keep in
mind a warning given by Borchard, the leading authority in this
field of the law, when he said:
"But the declaratory judgment is not intended as a
sedative to enable fearsome people to 'sleep o'nights', or to
enable or permit the courts to decide abstract, hypothetical,
or academic questions. The court must be alert to establish
the fact that the issue is contested, that the parties have an
adverse legal interest in its adjudication, and that by the
decision a practical end in clarifying, quieting, and stabi-
lizing the legal position will be subserved. This purpose
may not appear on the face of the pleadings, but it is the
duty of the judge to call for sufficient facts to enable him
to determine the intent and objectives of the suit and to
satisfy himself that a useful purpose is served by making a
declaration of rights.' ""
-- Jerome Paulson.
PROCEDURE: SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON DOICOLI-
ARY BY NOTICE OUTSIDE THE STATE
In Volume I of the Montana Law Review1 the suggestion
was made that probably the United States Supreme Court would
uphold substituted service upon a domiciliary in any action in
personam, even though he be outside the state, provided he re-
ceives actual notice-this, by virtue of the extraterritorial
authority of a state over her domiciliaries.
"SUNDERLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIOq
(1937) p. 317.
uBorchard, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 260.
'McNamer, Sub8tituted Servie on Resident Motorists, 1 MoNT. L. REV.
No. 1, p. 51 (1940).
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NOTE AND COMMENT
Since the publication of Volume I, the United States Su-
preme Court has affirmed the suggestion there made, in the
case of Milliken v. Meyer,' by holding that domiciliation within
a state is sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the
reach of a state's jurisdiction, for purposes of a personal judg-
ment, by means of appropriate substituted service. The court
went on to say that the adequacy of substituted service, so far
as due process is concerned, is dependent on whether or not the
particular form of service is reasonably calculated to give the
defendant actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity
to be heard, and that such substituted service may be wholly
adequate to meet the requirements of due process as was rec-
ognized in McDonald v. Mabee," despite earlier intimations to
' (1940) - U. S. -, 85 L. Ed. 269, - S. Ct. -. The case
arose in Colorado on a suit to enforce a personal judgment rendered
by the Wyoming court. Though domiciled in Wyoming, the defendant
had been absent from the state for some time and was personally
served with a notice of the Wyoming proceeding In Colorado, pursuant
to the Wyoming statutes, but he made no appearance in the Wyoming
cause, judgment going against him by default. In the present suit the
Colorado court held that the Wyoming decree was void on its face
because of an irreconcilable conflict between the findings and the
decree, not passing on the finding of its lower court that Wyoming
had jurisdiction over defendant. After declaring that Colorado must
give full faith and credit to the Wyoming judgment, if that state had
personal jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court proceeded to
say: "The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges incident to
domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One
such incidence of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even
during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and
employed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of
the proceedings against him."
(1917) 243 U. S. 90, 61 L. Ed. 608, 37 S. Ct. 343, L. R. A. 1917F 458.
It Is submitted that the case of Milliken v. Meyer does not directly
affect the holding in McDonald v. Mabee which is to the effect that
to dispense with personal service the substituted service that is most
likely to reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required to
satisfy due process requirements. The question of whether a state
could subject its absent domiciliaries to jurisdiction in personam by
publication, in view of McDonald v. Mabee and Milliken v. Meyer, Is
an independent question. It would seem, however, that in any case
in which the court admits that publication Is as likely to give actual
notice to a domiciliary who cannot be found, as any other available
method, that form of substituted service will be constitutional under
McDonald v. Mabee. Cf. De La Montanya v. De La Montanya (1896)
112 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345, 53 Am. St. Rep. 165. This case generally is
cited as ruling that substituted service on a domiciliary merely by
publication is not sufficient, McDonald v. Mabee, supra; BowERS,
PRocEss AND SzRVICE (1927) p. 429, note 64, although in fact a copy
of the complaint and summons were sent defendant by mail. The
majority of the court seems to consider the case simply one of service
by publication. Further, the majority relied on Pennoyer v. Neff
(1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565, as prohibiting any kind of substi-
tuted service on residents and non-residents alike, which now is ad-
mitted to be a wrong interpretation of that case. Now it generally
2
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the contrary in Pennoyer v. Neff."
Apparently it is assumed by the Montana legal profession
that any kind of substituted service on a Montana domiciliary,
while outside the state, would be ineffective to give a Montana
court jurisdiction in personam over such domiciliary. It is not
clear whether this assumption is based on supposed constitu-
tional limitations, a misconception of the common law, the
wording of the Montana statutes, or possibly a combination of
all three. Since the United States Supreme Court has affirmed
this power of a State in Milliken v. Meyer, at least where the
absent domiciliary is given actual notice, it may be worthwhile
to reopen the question of whether an absent domiciliary can be
so served under the existing law in Montana.
If the assumption that Montana law does not authorize
such substituted service is based on supposed Federal Consti-
tutional limitations, Milliken v. Meyer clearly overcomes any
objection in this regard. If it is based upon supposed require-
ments of the common law directing that our statutes be not
interpreted to authorize such service, a brief examination of
the common law will show that this is not so. It has long been
recognized that a State has jurisdiction to subject its domi-
ciliaries to such service if it sees fit.! Insofar as the assump-
is recognized that that case only ruled that a non-resident defendant
is not Subject to any form of substituted service in a personal action.
'(1877) 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565.
'In considering the "common law" of service of process, the dominating
question actually is, "How much power will the courts of one State
recognize as existing in another to subject prospective defendants
before the latter's courts to a form of substituted service?" RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§77 and 79 recognize unequivocally that a
State has jurisdiction to subject its domiciliaries to substituted serv-
ice by the generally accepted common law. In Henderson v. Staniford
(1870) 105 Mass. 504, 7 Am. Rep. 551, the plaintiff was denied the
right to sue in Massachusetts on his original cause of action after
having secured a California judgment based on substituted service by
publication, although the defendant had left California. Bryant v.
Shute's Ex'r. (1912) 147 Ky. 268, 144 S. W. 28. See: Miedreich v.
Lauenstein (1914) 232 U. S. 236, 34 S. Ct. 309. In re Hendrickson
(1918) 40 S. D. 211, 167 N. W. 172, and Becker v. Becker (Tex. Civ.
App. 1920) 218 S. W. 542 both readily approve their own statutes pro-
viding for substituted service on their domiciliaries by giving actual
notice outside the state. Though this is not a direct "recognition"
of power in another state to exercise such jurisdiction, it is submitted
that such is the intendment of these cases, because, unlike English
courts, these courts could easily have ruled the statutes unconsti-
tutional if they had not considered the enactment of such statutes
a reasonable exercise of legislative authority. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (2d ed. 1938) pp. 158-161; BKurL, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935)
§79.1; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) pp. 75, 76. Contra: Raher
v. Raher (1911) 150 Iowa 511, 129 N. W. 494. See Arthur A. Morrow,
Juri8dietion in Personam Acquired by Extraterritorial Service
of notice, IOWA BAR REvrsw, November Issue, 1934, p. 9. (published
3
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NOTE AND COMMENT
tion is based on the literal wording of the statute, a careful an-
alysis of the statute, it is believed, will show that such assump-
tion is not justified.
R. C. M. 1935, Section 9117 provides:
"When the person on whom the service of a summons
is to be made . . .has departed from the state, or cannot,
after due diligence, be found within the state, or conceals
himself to avoid the service of summons; .. .and an affi-
davit stating any of these facts is filed with the clerk of
the court in which the action is brought, . . the clerk shall
cause the service . . . to be made by publication .... The
provisions of this section shall apply to all actions and
proceedings in which personal service of summons is not
required to be made in order to obtain relief, including
every action or proceeding . . . to enforce any legal or
equitable lien upon, or claim to, or to remove any encum-
brance, or lien, or cloud, upon the title of real or personal
property within this state."
R. C. M. 1935, Section 9118 provides, in part, that "
When publication is ordered, personal service' of a copy of the
summons and complaint out of the state is equivalent to publi-
cation and deposit in the postoffice. .. ."
Section 9117 has to do only with publication. However,
this comment seeks to do no more than to establish actual notice
outside of the state, in the manner required under Section 9118,
as a recognized statutory form of substituted service. It is
clear that wherever Section 9117 authorizes publication, See-
in 20 IOWA L. Rzv., 1934-5). For a definition of jurisdiction as a
"recognized power" see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §42.
There is the subordinate question of how a common law system
ordinarily ezercise8 its power to subject to jurisdiction by substituted
service. Is there a common law rule providing for such process in
the absence of statute? A very recent Montana case answers in the
negative-State v. District Court (1940) 110 Mont. 61, 99 P. (2d) 211:
"There is no common law directly applicable to the publication of
summons, since such service was unknown to the common law, and
is of comparatively recent and strictly statutory origin (50 C. J. 496,
sec. 105; 502, sec. 114)." BAT.E, CONICTc OF LAWS (1935) §79.1.
See: GoODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) p. 159. Service of
process by posting at the market place or at the main cross roads Is
of ancient origin, and it is doubtful that it always has been founded
solely in statute. However, the subject of process is so generally
covered by statute today that it uniformly is treated as being founded
in and limited by statute.
'R. C. M. 1935, §§9117 and 9118 carefully distinguish between the
"service of process" and service of a copy of the process, apparently
preserving the ordinary rule that process as such Is ineffective beyond
the borders of the state issuing it. So, we may say that the subjection
of a domiciliary to process In the technical sense, is not necessary in
view of the holding in Milliken v. Meyer.
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tion 9118 authorizes actual notice. Hence, our immediate con-
cern is with the question: "When is publication permissible
under Section 9117?" The answer to this question must then
be considered as becoming a part of Section 9118 for the pur-
pose of stating the conditions under which actual notice outside
the state may be deemed a statutory form of substituted serv-
ice.'
The first part of Section 9117 was taken from a California
statute' which, at the time, clearly authorized such service in
actions in personam. The statute provided, in part:
"Where the person on whom service is to be made ...
has departed from the state; or cannot, after due diligence,
be found within the state; or conceals himself to avoid the
service of summons; . . .and the fact appears by affi-
davit . . . , or by the verified complaint on file, that a
cause of action exists against the defendant in respect to
whom the service is to be made, or that he is a necessary or
proper party to the action; or (when the action) ... re-
lates to ... real or personal property .. . the service may
be made by the publication of the summons." (Italics sup-
plied)
This section is clearly in the alternative--applying either
to actions in personam or actions in rem. It also seems clear
that the phrase, "Where the person on whom the service is to
'It is possible to interpret Section 9118 as authorizing notice outside
the State only when publication is constitutionally available under
§9117, but such construction is by no means necessary. Section 9117
first should be interpreted alone, to cover the provisions for publica-
tion; then it will be deemed incorporated by implication into Section
9118, thus forming an independent Section substituting the "notice" pro-
visions of the latter for the "publication" provisions of the former,
and standing as an absolutely independent basis for substituted serv-
ice by actual notice. Such construction is consistent with the history
of Section 9117 especially, indicating a legislative intention to author-
ize as comprehensive a substituted service as is constitutional. More-
over, there seems little reason to make substituted service by notice
absolutely dependent upon the constitutionality of such service by pub-
lication, when the United States Supreme Court considers the giving
of actual notice to a domiciliary, where possible, as always preferable
to subjecting him to personal jurisdiction by publication. Though the
Wyoming "publication" statute (Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1920, §5636) is
very explicit as to persons subject, the actual personal notice outside
the state in Milliken v. Meyer, our leading case, was made under a
Section (Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1920, §5641) very similar to our §9118.
The possibility of the "notice" section being limited constitutionally
by the "publication" section, was not even considered. It is extremely
likely that the Wyoming Supreme Court will treat their §5641 as
authorizing an independent form of substituted service, in the light of
the United States Supreme Court's decision.
'See KR's CYc. CODES OF CALi. 1908, CoDn Or CxvIL Psocnua , §412
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be made. . . ." was intended to include any and all persons
without exception.
Perhaps the statutory history of this section in Montana is
of even greater importance in demonstrating that under the
language of the first part of the section, all persons, without ex-
ception, were included. The original Bannack Statutes, Section
30, enacted in 1864, uses substantially the same language as our
present Code to describe the classes of persons subject to sub-
stituted service, emphasizing, however, that any person in hid-
ing should be so subjected. And until 1907 there was no
"limitation" whatever in the wording of the statute itself as
to the persons subject thereto or the kind of action in which
service by publication was possible. In that year for the first
time, the qualifications introduced by "The provisions of this
section shall apply. . . ," were added by amendment. Very
possibly this was added simply from a growing conviction that
due process requirements of the Pederal Constitution com-
pelled some limitations upon the use of substituted service in
a personal action.
Both the history and the enlightened form of the clause,
"The provisions of this section shall apply to all actions .. .
in which personal service . . is not required . . . ," would seem
to indicate an intention to draft the statute in such a manner
as to insure its constitutionality' and at the same time to provide
for, as nearly as possible, the complete substituted service which
the original California, and probably the early Montana statutes
were intended to include. In view of Milliken v. Meyer, it is
clear that so far as constitutional limitations are concerned, at
least some forms of substituted service on absent domiciliaries
are possible under this phrasing, as personal service of the sum-
mons is not required in actions in personam on an absent domi-
ciliary, in order to satisfy due process. Hence, to this point,
the language of Section 9117 seems to authorize any and all
substituted service which constitutionally can be made. If there
is any language prohibiting substituted service on an absent
'It is submitted that probably the case of Pennoyer v. Neff caused
many lawyers and legislators to doubt the constitutionality of the
California, early Montana, and similar statutes, and that revisions of
said statutes, subsequent to Pennoyer v. Neff, were attempts to insure
the constitutionality of the statutes, while at the same time changing
the scope of the statutes as little as possible. By "the enlightened
form of the statute" is meant that it was apparently drafted with
Pennoyer v. Neff in mind, and was intended to apply to all actions in
which, the United States Supreme Court should in the future, de-
termine that personal service was not necessary. Thus, when the
United States Supreme Court, in Miliken v. Meyer, decided that per-
sonal service was not necessary on an absent domiciliary, the statute
is so framed as to apply automatically to such absent domiciliaries.
6
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domiciliary in a personal action, provided he receives actual
notice, it must be found in some other part of the statute.
The clause, "including every action . . . " immediately
following the general clause quoted above, might be taken to re-
strict the previous universal language to those actions enumer-
ated." However, it is submitted that this phrase, instead of in-
dicating the full scope of the previous general language, merely
illustrates some of the members of a much larger class which
is included in the universal phrase. There is a strong presump-
tion in the decisions that the word "including" either intro-
duces an enumeraton of illustrative members of a much larger
class, or enlarges the class previously referred to, by the mem-
bers enumerated.' Either construction supports the conclusion
here submitted.
Further, the Montana cases, approving generally service by
publication on a non-resident in a divorce action, seem to offer
compelling authority establishing that this clause is only an
enumeration of some of a larger class. Section 9117 is used
regularly in such actions to set forth the conditions which must
be complied with before service by publication in divorce will
'*In fact, both the court and the profession seem to assume that §9117
provides for publication in all In rem actions even though not enum-
erated. However, to any contention that the legislature must have
intended to refer only to "in rem" actions a complete answer seems to
be that they so easily and simply could have said "shall apply to in
rem actions." The supposed traditional common law distinction be-
tween actions "in personam" and "in rem," never has been really
recognized by the common law as furnishing a basis for measuring
the absolute limits of legislative power to subject the defendant to
jurisdiction. These categories of actions for this purpose, have been
given emphasis in our current law by supposed constitutional limita-
tions now shown to be altogether without foundation. Hence, at
most, they should be used for no more than as a basis for raising a
presumption as to legislative intention where the statutory language
actually is ambiguous on its face. There is no ambiguity whatsoever
on the face of this statute.
uIn re Goetz's Will (1902) 71 App. Div. 272, 75 N. Y. S. 750: In a
bequest "of all my personal property, including furniture, plate, etc,,"
the word "including" was held not to limit the bequest to the property
enumerated after the wording, but to cover all of testator's personal
property; Cunningham v. Sizer Steel Corp. (W. D. N. Y. 1924) 1 F.
(2d) 337: Steel manufacturing corporation's trust mortgage, covering
real estate and fixed property of company and all mills, factories,
etc., expressly Including certain specific things mentioned as being
located on described real estate, held not to cover merely specific
property particularized following word "including," or property of like
nature, since such word Is not a term of limitation, notwithstanding
ejuadem generis rule; Cannon v. Nicholas (C. C. A. 10th 1935) 80 F.
(2d) 934: Statute authorizing distraint of delinquent taxpayer's
goods, "including" stocks, securities, bank accounts, and evidences
of debt, held not intended to exempt intangible property not listed,
such as annuity policy, although "bank accounts" was added to the
class enumerated, by amendment to the statute in 1924, rule that ex-
7
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be sufficient." The court seems unhesitatingly to assume that
this section authorizes such service though divorce actions are
not actually named anywhere in it. No other construction pos-
sibly can be given the cases, particularly if the Montana Su-
preme Court means it when it says that substituted service is of
strictly statutory origin," since it appears that there is no other
statutory authority for service by publication in a divorce ac-
tion.
There are Montana decisions making general statements
to the effect that substituted service will not support a judg-
ment in a proceeding strictly in personam,1' but apparently all
of these cases deal with non-resident defendants and so should
not control the present question.
In conclusion, it would seem that, in view of Milliken v.
Meyer, the history of, and construction to which R. C. M. 1935,
Sections 9117 and 9118 are susceptible, and the accepted doc-
trine of a State's power over its domiciliaries, the Montana Su-
preme Court might well hold that actual notice, without the
state, on an absent domiciliary, is sufficient to give Montana
courts jurisdiction in actions in personam." There is no doubt
that this form of substituted service is urgently needed," par-
pression of one thing is exclusion of another being unavailable. See
also: Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Motter (D. C. Kan. 1932) 1 F. Supp.
464, 468; U. S. v. Nat. City Bank (S. D. N. Y. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 791,
795; Heffner v. Ketchen (1931) 50 Idaho 435, 296 P. 768, 770; Include,
31 C. J. p. 395; ANNOTATION: 97 A. L. R. 1382.
01olt v. Sather (1927) 81 Mont. 442, 264 P. 108; In re Huppe (1932)
92 Mont. 211, 11 P. (2d) 793 (disbarment proceeding based on a di-
vorce proceeding in which substituted service was had under §9117).
"Supra, note 5.
"Winnet Times Pub. Co. v. Berg (1928) 82 Mont. 141, 265 P. 710 (de-
fendant, resident of Oregon, served personally in Oregon) ; Gassert v.
Strong (1908) 38 Mont. 18, 98 P. 497 (defendant, resident of N. Y.,
served by publication); Silver Camp Mining Co. v. Dickert (1904)
31 Mont. 488, 78 P. 967 (defendant, resident of Utah, served person-
ally in Utah).
"If it be admitted that the interpretation of our section's actual lang-
uage, set forth above, is reasonable, it is submitted that the court
should be persuaded readily to so construe the section in the light of
R. C. M. 1935, §10519, and the great mass of cases applying that sec-
tion, to the effect that, ".... the judge is simply to ascertain and de-
clare what Is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert
what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted .. "
"GooDRICH, CONFLICT Or LAws (2d ed. 1938) pp. 158, 159: "It would be
very inconvenient if this (personal jurisdiction over a domiciliary by
substituted service) were not the law. An individual may be conceal-
ing himself to avoid service of process; he may be absent in parts un-
known. But every person has a domicile. Furthermore, even though
absent he is affected by his domiciliary law. That law governs his
personal status; it determines his liability for certain taxes; it de-
termines the devolution of his property if he dies intestate. There is
good basis for saying, therefore, that he is subject to suit there, and
8
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ticularly where a domiciliary is evading the jurisdiction of the
court. If it be felt that such service should be strictly limited,
this is done by the express terms of the statute which require
that a diligent search be made, with supporting affidavit. Also,
where the defendant receives actual notice, there doesn't seem
to be the same reason for requiring proof of a diligent search
as in the case of publication.
-Murray D. Syverud
PROCEDURE: THE STATUS OF THE ASSIGNEE FOR
COLLECTION UNDER REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST STATUTES
The "Field Code" of 1848 gave rise to an entirely revised
form of procedure intended to combine in one form of acton, the
civil action, pleading at both common law and equity The gen-
eral statutory form stating the rule for parties plaintiff to this
civil action as adopted by many states is: "Every action must
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest .... "
Following this general statement there are exceptions which vary
in different states in phrasiology and contextual setting. How-
ever, the words with regard to the "real party in interest"
used in the statutes mean the same thing.! It is the purpose of
this comment to consider whether the assignee of a chose in ac-
tion assigned for the purpose of collection' is the real party in
interest within the meaning of R. C. M. 1935, Section 9067 or
similar statutes in other states.
In the leading case of State v. Merchants' Credit Service,"
the Montana court held that such an assignee for collection
only was not the real party in interest and therefore was not
entitled to sue in its own name. Although the court made some
point of the fact that the collection agreement was set out in
the assignment instead of being "a collateral agreement" as is
that a court of that state may be empowered to render a personal
judgment against him which is valid, even though he is not personally
served within the state."
'Brumback v. Oldham (1878) 1 Idaho 709; PoMEBOY, CODE REManI
(5th ed. 1929) §§4, 50, pp. 5, 6, 83.
'Id. §§51, 53, 63, pp. 83, 86, 97. See also fn. 9, ifra.
'This comment does not deal with assignments "for security" and as-
signments of negotiable instruments. The former involve a pre-exist-
ing interest in the assignee and the latter involve highly specialized
rules of the Law Merchant. This distinction was made in State v.
Merchants' Credit Service (1936) 104 Mont. 76, 66 P. (2d) 337; and
see 1 WIrLISTON ON CONTRACTS (1924) §406, p. 754.
(1936) 104 Mont. 76, 66 P. (2d) 337.
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